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AN ANOMALY IN APPELLATE PRACTICE
EFFECT OF CONFESSIONS OF ERROR IN CRIMINAL CASES;
THE RULE IN COLORADO.
By Frank Swancara of the Denver Bar
HE procedure which is taken by appellate courts in most
of the jurisdictions outside of Colorado, when and after
confessions of error are filed in criminal cases, is that
which was followed in an Arkansas case.' The Rev. Elijah
Skaggs "wanted to be hung" in order that he might "on the
third day rise and redeem the world" in his capacity as
"Elijah, King of the Gentiles". He brought about an indict-
ment of himself for the crime of rape, punishable in that state
by hanging. The jury found him guilty of a lesser offense,
and assessed his punishment at 21 years in the penitentiary.
Being thus thwarted in his scheme for the redemption of the
world, he appealed to the Supreme Court. The Attorney
General confessed error as to four different matters. Counsel
for the Rev. Skaggs submitted the case upon such confession.
The Supreme Court proceeded to examine and discuss the
points raised by the Attorney General, and found no reversible
error in the record. The judgment was affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed a judgment of
conviction in a case where the Attorney General had filed a
confession of error, but did so because the confession had
"support in the transcript of the record."'  A like situation
arose in North Carolina. While the appellate court reversed
the judgment, it did not do so merely because of the Attorney
General's admissions. In the opinion the court said :'
"While the opinion of the state's attorney has much weight with us,
it is our practice to examine the record carefully ourselves before setting aside
a conviction for crime."
In a Washington case counsel for appellants who had
been convicted of a crime obtained from the prosecuting at-
torney a stipulation "to the effect that the conduct of the trial
court was prejudicial and reversible error."' The Supreme
Court said:
I. Skaggs v. State, 113 S. W. 346.
2. Tucker v. State, 105 So. 140. Accord: Mo.-State v Goddard, 48 S. W. 82.
3. State v. Stevhens. 69 S. E. II.
4. State v. Waite, 238 Pac. 617.
DICTA
"The attorneys, of course, know that we cannot affirm or reverse a case
simply because it is stipulated that there is or is not error in the record."
The Appellate Court in Illinois, in a contempt case, re-
fused to reverse the judgment, notwithstanding the fact that
the State's Attorney had confessed error, "asking that the
judgment be reversed."5
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has many
times followed the following procedure :'
"Where the Attorney General confesses error, this court will examine
the record, and, if the confession is sustained thereby, and is well founded in
law, the conviction will be reversed."
We come now to the subject of the procedure in Colorado.
The best case from an illustrative standpoint is Richardson v.
People.' There seven persons had been charged with murder
in the first degree. At the conclusion of the trial the jury
found two of them guilty of voluntary manslaughter. A writ
of error was sued out by the convicted defendants, and execu-
tion of a sentence to the state penitentiary was stayed.
In the case in question a vast array of able lawyers pre-
pared, signed, and filed in the office of the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court an abstract of the record and a voluminous and
exhaustive brief on behalf of the plaintiffs in error. There-
after, and on January 9, 1917, the Attorney General then in
office, with two assistant attorneys general, filed a brief on
behalf of the people, contending for an affirmance of the
judgment. On April 13, 1917, the reply brief was filed.
The next step taken in the case was upon September 27,
1917. On that date the succeeding Attorney General filed a
Confession of Error. This had the effect, indirectly, of strik-
ing from the files the brief of the first Attorney General.
According to the "uniform rule," hereinafter discussed, the
court could have disposed of the case the same day as that
upon which the confession was filed. However, no official
announcement was made regarding the cause until January
7, 1918. On that date the court filed the following memoran-
dum:
5. The People v. Mortenson, 224 II. App. 221.
6. Bindrum v. State, 228 Pac. 168; Raymer v. State, 228 Pac. 500: Henderso. v. State, 197 Pac.
720; Green v. State, 193 Pac. 1,077; Scwake v. State, 228 Pac. 168': Brasheers v. State, 192
Pac. 433.
8. 69 Colo. 155, 170 Pac. 189.
DICTA
"Per Curiam.
"Plaintiffs in error were convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sen-
tenced to serve terms in the penitentiary. They have assigned and argued
numerous alleged errors occuring in the trial of the cause, which they claim
entitled them to a reversal of the judgment. The prosecution, acting through
the attorney general, has filed a confession of error and asks for a reversal of
the judgment. Onder these circumstances, it is not incumbent upon us to
investigate the record and determine as to the correctness of his conclusions.
We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the cause."
The difference between that pronouncement and what was
said and done by courts in other jurisdictions under like cir-
cumstances is obvious. It was "not incumbent" upon the court
either to "investigate the record" or to examine the brief of
the first Attorney General. The court ignored the existence
or filing of that brief in another respect. The title page fur-
nished to the publishers of the report of the case, as well as
the caption sheet attached to the original memorandum, con-
tained neither the name of the first Attorney General nor the
names of the two Assistant Attorneys General who acted and
appeared in the cause with him. In the reports of other cases
the names of all attorneys who ever appeared are published,
including that of any Attorney General who went out of office
before the cause was determined.'
There is no reason for supposing that the court intended
to assume that the Attorney General was infallible in the
matter of "the correctness of his conclusions." The filing of
a confession of error implies a disagreement, as to a matter
of law, with the prosecuting attorney who tried the case and
with the trial judge who overruled a motion for a new trial,
as well as with any predecessor in office who filed a brief in
support of an affirmance. Such other officials may have been
correct in their conclusions. The reason for the court's action
in reversing, without opinion, the judgment of conviction in
Richardson ;v. People appears but imperfectly in the memo-
randum filed. In an earlier case,1" however, the court said:
"The attorney general has presented a confession of error and asks a
reversal of the judgment.
"It is the uniform rule of this court in such cases to act affirmatively
upon such request of the attorney general. By the Constitution and statutes
9. E. g. Lawson v. People, 63 Colo. 270, 165 Pac. 771.
10. Soto v. People, 64 Colo. 528, 173 Pac. 399.
DICTA
of this state the Attorney General is the only person who is authorized by
law to appear for the people, before the Supreme Court. The duty and
responsibility of the control of such cases are his. * * *
"The judgment is reversed."
Obviously, therefore, the reversal of the judgment in
Richardson v. People was not on account of any serious or
reversible error in the record but simply because of the "re-
quest of the attorney general." The request in question is
acted "affirmatively upon" because, it is said, he has "control"
of the case. The Supreme Court of Iowa" has discussed the
question of "control," under statutes not materially different
from ours, but when in a case12 thereafter arising the attorney
authorized to appear for the state filed "a written confession
of errors" the court did not reverse the judgment solely be-
cause of such confession but did so for the reason apparent
from the following language of the memorandum it filed:
"As the errors confessed appear to be prejudicial, the appli-
cation to * * * reverse and remand it, will be granted." The
court first satisfied itself that the alleged errors were in fact
"prejudicial".
In civil actions, where each party has control of his own
case, appellate courts have refused "to reverse the judgment
of a trial court upon an agreement of the litigants that the
judgment of said trial court is erroneous, or upon a confession
of error, unless the record discloses that the trial court's judg-
ment was, in fact or law, erroneous."' 3
In Alabama the refusal was upon the ground that the
confession of error could not be allowed to "oust a court of
its appellate jurisdiction, or limit the principle of decision
by excluding certain legal considerations which may be per-
tinent to the issue.""
Prior to the reversal of the judgment in Richardson v.
People, the main case herein discussed, our Supreme Court
said that "it appears to have been the uniform practice of this
court to reverse the case upon his (the attorney general's)
confession of error, without giving it further consideration,"
but added that inasmuch as the former Attorney General, dur-
II. State v. Fleming, 13 Iowa 443.
12. State v. Bailey, 85 Ia. 713, 50 N. W. 561.
13. Riley v. Commissioners' Court (Tex. C. A. 1929), 12 S. W. 2nd 1072. Atcord: Sivley v.
Sivley (Miss.), 50 So. 552; Webb Sumner Oil Mill v. Southern Coal Co. (Miss.), 91 So. 698.
14. Boss Livery Co. v. Griffith, 85 So. 849.
DICTA
ing his term of office, had filed a brief in support of "the
regularity of the conviction, * * *" it is "the better practice
to pass upon some of the assignments of error, or one of them
at least, upon which the present Attorney General has con-
fessed error."'1 The "better practice" was not followed in the
Richardson case, determined later, and so we may conclude
that that practice has been abandoned.
According to the "uniform rule" of reversing a criminal
case upon the confession of error "without giving it further
consideration," the attorney general may confess any error,
trivial, harmless, or otherwise, aihd thereby obtain a reversal
of the judgment upon his mere "request." It lies in his power,
therefore, to prevent the court from applying, and the public
from benefiting by, the rule embodied in the following judicial
pronouncement:
"Where one knowingly and willfully violates the law, and his guilt is
clearly proven, he cannot successfully rely for a reversal on technical errors
occurring during a trial.""6
If it be assumed that an attorney general will always act
honestly and studiously in filing a confession of error, the
fact still remains that he may be mistaken as to the law or
the record. He is as apt to be wrong in making a "request"
for a reversal as he sometimes is in contending for an affirm-
ance.
There is a possibility that the attorney general erred in
filing the confession in the Richardson case. At least the court
could have had plausible, if not unassailable, grounds for
affirming the judgment if the alleged errors were only those
confessed. The confession in that case involved, in substance,
only two points, one concerning an instruction to the jury and
the other relating to remarks of the trial judge (Cavender).
There was a count in the information upon which plain-
tiffs in error had been tried which charged the specific act
of murder to some person unknown to the district attorney, and
then alleged that the defendants were then and there present,
standing by, aiding, abetting and assisting such unknown per-
son to commit the murder. The court instructed the jury that
if defendants "aided, abetted or assisted" the one actually
IS. Lawson v. People, 63 Colo. 270, 165 Pac. 771.
16. May v. People, 236 Pac. 1,022; Gizewski v. People, 239 Pac. 1,026.
DICTA
guilty of murder in the commission of such crime, they them-
selves were guilty of murder. The first alleged error con-
fessed consisted in the failure of the trial court to make the
instruction more complete and instruct that the defendants
must also be found to have known the criminal intent of the
person aided or abetted.
The confession of error did not say that the instruction
as given had been objected to, but assuming that a proper
objection had been made, the court might have found the
error, if such it was, not reversible, under the following rule :t"
"An instruction which follows the language of the statute in defining
a principal or an accessory will ordinarily be sufficient, and usually it is better
to do so."
Again, the court might have held the error cured by ver-
dict, which found the defendants guilty only of voluntary
manslaughter. At common law, and under statutes declara-
tory thereof, there cannot be accessories before the fact to
voluntary manslaughter, which is killing in the heat of sudden
passion and without malice," and is, therefore, inconsistent
with the idea of premeditation." Error in defining accessories
is harmless when the verdict is for voluntary manslaughter.
The second alleged error confessed related to remarks of
the trial judge made in connection with rulings on the admissi-
bility of certain evidence or the propriety of certain questions
propounded to witnesses. In the instructions to the jury the
trial court embodied the usual charge to disregard remarks
of either court or counsel made during the progress of the trial.
If the Supreme Court had reviewed the record and ex-
amined all the briefs it might have agreed with the first
Attorney General and his two assistants who had argued for
an affirmance and in conclusion said:
"We conscientiously believe that the defendants here had a fair and
impartial trial and that the verdict of the jury should be affirmed by this
court."
The Richardson case was never retried. It was reversed
nearly four years after the homicide charged was committed,
and more than three years after the trial.
17. I Randall's Instructions, section 314.
1S. Sec. 6,666 C. L. 1921.
19. 29 C. J. 1,066, section 38.
DICTA
For reasons hereinbefore indicated, the appellate pro-
cedure in Colorado in criminal cases is such that any criminal
may escape punishment if he or his friends can induce the
attorney general to file a confession of error, or if that official
files such a document because of some mistake on his part.
Some criminal cases are not tried more than once, for reasons
familiar to the profession. Where such cases reach the Su-
preme Court, the attorney general has the power to nullify,
in effect, the provisions of the state constitution relating to
the pardoning power.
If a criminal case is remanded on the "request" of the
attorney general, and never retried, the defendant has all of
the benefits and none of the stigma of a pardon. When the
governor exercises his constitutional pardoning power the
public is aware of the fact, and the executive may be subjected
to adverse criticism. When the attorney general exercises his
indirect pardoning power the people are not familiar with his
procedure, and they may on learning of the "reversal" assume
that the District Attorney had recklessly injected error into
the record and that the trial judge had stupidly permitted him
to do so. Moreover, county officials may be unjustly accused
of having unwisely spent large sums of the people's money in
maintaining a prosecution which did not result in the incar-
ceration of the accused.
Under the "uniform rule" in Colorado a reversal of the
judgment in a criminal case when made upon the "request"
of the attorney general is without any opinion on any point of
law. This situation makes pertinent the following language
of the Court of Appeals of Alabama:
"It would be puzzling to say the least, as to how the trial court would
proceed in another trial of this cause, should we act on the confession of
error, * * * "20
Only in Colorado has it ever been judicially said that
there may be, in a criminal case, a "reversal without com-
ment.1' 1  In other jurisdictions where a reversal occurs fol-
lowing a confession of error either the confession is quoted in
full or the error confessed is so set forth as to enable the trial
court to know how to proceed in the event of another trial. 2
20. Boss Livery Co. v. Griffith, 85 So. 849.
21. Zancannelli v. People, 63 Colo: 252, 254.
22. Bindrum v. State (Okla.), 228 Pac. 168; Harris v. Corn. (Va.), 68 S. E. 834; State v. Ward
(S. D.), 155 N. W. 185.
